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System administrators, don't send data recovery jobs to $400/job companies - they concentrate on the 88% of jobs that are super easy, that you could have done yourself. Transparen concentrates on the other 12%, and provides 90% success rate in 3-5 days.

Data Recovery for System Administrators and Technical People - Arizona

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88% Of Hard Drive Recoveries are So Easy, You Could Have Done Them

Hard drive recovery sounds super easy and profitable - and it is, if you are claiming to provide data recovery for the 88% of hard drives that have simple easy-to-fix problems.  For 88% of hard drive failures are actually very simple problems that did not need to go all the way to a data recovery company.  These are problems that could easily have been solved by system administrators, computer technicians, or hobbyists.

No wonder data recovery companies are springing up like grass in Vancouver, all claiming to have a price lower than the next.  They are made up of system administrators, computer technicians, and hobbyists.

Low-End Data Recovery Covers the Easy Recoveries That You Could Have Done

Exactly the kind of people you want to send your drive to, in order to save a few bucks right?  Well, we would argue, to do that would be very dangerous.

First, such companies will fade with time into distant memories - they do not have the staying power of serious data recovery companies that invest millions of dollars into research and development to always be on the forefront of data recovery and which are always trusted by businesses and individuals who need data back quickly and cost-effectively.

Ask Not Who is Cheaper - Ask If you want "Cheap, Problematic, Inconsistent Data Recovery" that you could have done yourself, or "Reasonably Priced, Consistently High Quality, Fast Data Recovery"

Second, the low-end companies are just going to do things that you, as a system administrator or computer technician, could have done.  If they succeed, a reasonable question to ask would be 'Why didn't you do it yourself?'

High-end data recovery is always backed up by millions of dollars worth of research and experience.

If the low-end company fails, then a reasonable question to ask would be why you wasted your time with them since they would only do what you could have done.  And they might have made the situation worse for a real data recovery company.  But, if you are sending your drive away, isn't it because you don't want to take the risk of doing something wrong and ruining the chances of getting data back successfully?

If the Data Is Cheap Worthless Data, Not Deserving of Quality Data Recovery... Then What?

Regardless, there is also the question about the value of the data - is it less than $400, and there are no backups?  If so, then by sending the drive to a low-end data recovery company, a message is being communicated about the value of the person who produced the data.  Is this person earning more than $800/month?  If so then he/she should be very insulted to know that you value his/her productivity so little.

If you are the person speaking to a boss about whether to recover the data, this answer - what is the data from two weeks of work worth? - could influence how you are perceived for a long time to come.

What it boils down to is that Transparen is providing the good stuff - the data recovery that system administrators could not have done on their own - the data recovery that gets data back in 3-5 business days or faster - the data recovery that befits a modern knowledge worker and does not belittle his or her productivity.

Next steps:

1. Read more about our data recovery service.
2. Contact Transparen.

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In California, an Order modifying child support is reversed where the court erred in imputing $3,000 of non-taxable income per month based on husband's mortgage-free housing. For information on Arizona child support issues, contact NRG Family Law at www.nrglaw.net.In re Marriage of Schlafly (2007) , Cal.App.4th [No. H029918. Sixth Dist. Apr. 10, 2007.] In re the Marriage of JULIE and ROGER SCHLAFLY. JULIE SCHLAFLY, Respondent, v. ROGER SCHLAFLY, Appellant. [Opinion certified for partial publication. fn. * ] (Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, No. FL018328, Irwin Joseph, Judge.) (Opinion by Mihara, Acting P.J., with McAdams, J., and Duffy, J., concurring.) COUNSEL Roger Schlafly, In propria persona for Appellant. Julie Schlafly, In propria persona for Respondent. OPINION MIHARA, ACTING P.J.- Appellant Roger Schlafly, former husband of respondent Julie Schlafly, appeals from an order modifying child support. Roger fn. 1 claims that the court erred in imposing a child support payment that deviated from the guideline amount and in retroactively modifying child support without using actual income figures. Roger also claims the court erred in imposing an attorney's fees order contradicting an earlier order by the court. We conclude that the court erred in imputing $3,000 of non-taxable income per month based on Roger's mortgage-free housing. We therefore reverse the December 20, 2005 child {Slip Opn. Page 2} support order and remand the action for further proceedings. We affirm the attorney's fees order. I. Background Roger and Julie married in December 1996 and have two minor children, Millicent (born in 1997) and Geneva (born in 1999). Millicent was born three weeks after Julie graduated from law school, about six months into the marriage, and Julie remained at home throughout the marriage to care for the children. Roger, a mathematician, is self-employed and is an independent contractor in the computer software industry. In addition to other assets, Roger owns a minority interest in a closely-held corporation, several patents, his own business, and a mortgage-free home. The couple separated in October 2003, and Julie filed for dissolution of marriage. The parties initially split custody of the children fifty-fifty by mutual agreement, and, in July 2004, the court ordered Roger to provide Julie a temporary support payment of $3,000 per month. The court also set a hearing in August 2004 to discuss financial issues and ordered Roger to file and serve an income and expense declaration and to provide recent tax returns. During the August 30, 2004 hearing, the court (the Honorable Thomas Kelly presiding) chastised Roger for providing "evasive" answers and incomplete information regarding his financial situation. The court ultimately ordered $2,759 in child support, retroactive to July 1, 2004. In doing so, the court deviated from the guideline amount of $1,697 based on Roger's "living mortgage-free in house worth 3K/month." The additional $1,062 increased Roger's total support payment to $4,000 per month. The support order was made retroactively modifiable so that it could be revised when the court had "more information on father's actual income" and on Julie's efforts to enter the work force. On November 16, 2004, Roger's custody percentage decreased from 50 percent to approximately 20 percent. On May 13, 2005, the court conducted another status hearing {Slip Opn. Page 3} regarding financial issues. Judge Kelly modified the temporary support figures to reflect the adjusted timeshare, retroactive to November 16. In doing so, the court expressly stated that it was not taking into account the fact that Roger lived in a mortgage-free house: "Since today is a snapshot, temporary order, I'm not going to depart from guideline [based on a lack of mortgage] . . . . But she's going to make an argument next month I should depart from guideline as I did before." The child support order thus was modified to $2,575, the Dissomaster guideline amount based on the financial information then available. The court again ordered Roger to produce financial documents, intending to address the mortgage-free housing issue at a later hearing when the court believed more accurate information would be available. The support orders were again made retroactively modifiable, and the court entered a judgment of dissolution as to status only. Roger provided Julie with his 2004 tax return in October 2005, and a new hearing was set for December 2005 before Commissioner Irwin H. Joseph, who took over the case from Judge Kelly. On December 20, 2005, the court issued a new child support order of $2,525, effective January 1, 2006, "based on changed income and timeshare for father." The court ordered further modification, effective January 23, 2006, to $2,112, based on an anticipated increase in Roger's timeshare to 50 percent. In calculating the new payments, the court imputed a 3 percent rate of return for Roger's stock market portfolio as taxable income and imputed $3,000 in non-taxable income per month based on Roger's mortgage-free housing. After calculating the guideline amount, the court added $500 to provide for the children's education and activities, split evenly between the parties. Julie waived her rights to any future spousal support. In the December 20 order, the court also addressed past support payments. The court modified the child support order effective November 16, 2004 to account for Roger's mortgage-free housing, noting that "Judge Kelly failed to perpetuate his calculated deviation for father's housing circumstance." In this instance, the court adopted Judge Kelly's approach and added $1,062 to the guideline amount. {Slip Opn. Page 4} Roger filed a motion for modification, deemed a motion for reconsideration, contesting both the December 20 child support order and a December 16 order regarding attorney's fees. The court denied the motion on February 16, 2005. Roger timely appealed. II. Discussion Statutory guidelines regulate the determination of child support in California. (See Fam. Code, §§ 4050-4203.) fn. 2 The guidelines set forth several important principles relating to child support determinations, including that (1) the interests of the child are the state's top priority, (2) a parent's principal obligation is to support his or her children "according to the parent's circumstances and station in life[,]" (3) "[b]oth parents are mutually responsible for the support of their children[,]" (4) "[e]ach parent should pay for the support of the children according to his or her ability[,]" (5) children should share in both parents' standard of living, and (6) in cases "in which both parents have high levels of responsibility for the children[,]" child support orders "should reflect the increased costs of raising the children in two homes and should minimize significant disparities in the children's living standards in the two homes." (§ 4053, subd. (a)-(b), (d)-(g).) The guideline amount of child support, which is calculated by applying a mathematical formula to the relative incomes of the parents, is presumptively correct. (See §§ 4055, 4057, subd. (a); In re Marriage of de Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1359 (de Guigne).) "The court may depart from the guideline only in 'special circumstances' set forth in the child support statutes. (§ 4052)." (County of Stanislaus v. Gibbs (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1419.) A child support order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282 (Cheriton); see also In re Marriage of Destein (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1393 (Destein) ["A trial court's decision to impute income {Slip Opn. Page 5} to a parent for child support purposes based on the parent's earning capacity is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard."].) We determine "whether the court's factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence and whether the court acted reasonably in exercising its discretion." (de Guigne, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1360.) We do not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court, but determine only if any judge reasonably could have made such an order. (Ibid.) In this case, Roger claims the court "erroneously deviated from [the] guideline" amount by imputing a rate of return to his stock portfolio that exceeds the actual rate of return, by including $3,000 of non-taxable income based on his mortgage-free housing, and by imposing a discretionary add-on for the children's activities. He also claims the court failed to comply with section 4056, modified a temporary child support order using inaccurate figures, and erred in ordering him to pay an additional $6,500 in Julie's attorney's fees. A. Imputation of 3 Percent Rate of Return Roger first objects to the court's imputation of a 3 percent rate of return on his stock market portfolio. At the time of the order, Roger's portfolio contained approximately $2.9 million in assets and, according to Roger, paid dividends of about 1.6 percent annually. fn. 3 Roger contends that because the portfolio was income-producing, fn. 4 the {Slip Opn. Page 6} court was required to use the actual income received and was not authorized to impute additional income. We disagree. Section 4058, which defines annual gross income for purposes of child support calculations, expressly provides: "The court may, in its discretion, consider the earning capacity of a parent in lieu of the parent's income, consistent with the best interests of the children." (§ 4058, subd. (b).) This earning capacity doctrine "embraces the ability to earn from capital as well as labor." (de Guigne, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363; see also Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 671 ["[i]n assessing earning capacity, a trial court may take into account the earnings from invested assets"].) "Just as a parent cannot shirk his parental obligations by reducing his earning capacity through unemployment or underemployment, he cannot shirk the obligation to support his child by underutilizing income-producing assets." (In re Marriage of Dacumos (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 150, 155 (Dacumos), emphasis added.) In this case, the court implicitly determined that Roger's 1.6 percent return on almost $3 million of assets was an underutilization of the assets and that imputing a higher rate of return was in the best interests of the children. The court explained that the 3 percent figure was a more accurate reflection on the value of the assets; unless Roger was earning at least 3 percent annually in the stock market, he would invest in bonds and be guaranteed a 3 percent return. This determination was within the court's discretion. (See In re Marriage of LeBass (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1340 (LeBass) ["Section 4058 is unmistakably clear that the only qualification to the discretionary imputation of income is that it be consistent with the children's best interest."]; Destein, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396 ["[O]ur Supreme Court has refused to read any limitation into a trial court's discretion to impute income when in the child's best interests."].) The court's decision is well-supported by California caselaw. Dacumos, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 150 provides one persuasive example. In that case, the father owned two rental properties that generated higher expenses than the amount received in rent. (Id. at {Slip Opn. Page 7} p. 153.) The trial court nevertheless imputed rental income based on the fair market rental value of the properties and the father's net equity in the properties. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that a broad "definition of earning capacity to include income that could be derived from income-producing assets as well as from work is in accord with the legislative intent" and found no error. (Id. at pp. 154-155.) We find no basis to distinguish Dacumos, in which the properties were utilized as rentals but were underperforming, from the case at hand. Roger's $2.9 million stock market portfolio earns only the barest amount of "income," and, thus, is underutilized as an income-producing asset. Roger cites as support In re Marriage of Pearlstein (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1374-1375 (Pearlstein), in which the court held that stock received in the sale of the father's business was a capital asset, not income. The court's holding is not contrary to the approach taken in this case. The Pearlstein court in fact held that although the stock was a capital asset, "in the court's discretion, a reasonable rate of investment return could be imputed to the value of the stock that was available for sale, and that amount added to [the father's] gross income[.]" (Id. at p. 1376.) That is precisely the approach taken in this case. Roger's argument that the imputation is invalid because the court has no authority to direct his investment strategy also is unavailing. The trial court has broad discretionary authority to impute income and need not defer to the parent's choice of investment. (Destein, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.) Roger's decision to prioritize future value over current income does not mean that the $2.9 million in assets must be disregarded as a source of support. As the Destein court explained, quoting an opinion by the New York Court of Appeals, a parent "may be required to make his considerable assets earn income which, by an objective standard, is commensurate with at least a conservative estimate of what they are capable of producing, and, when he fails to do so, he may be treated as though he had; his decision to let them grow for his own future {Slip Opn. Page 8} benefit is not one which the courts are obliged to honor in all circumstances." (Id. at p. 1395, internal quotations omitted, quoting Kay v. Kay (1975) 37 N.Y.2d 632.) Ignoring the stock market portfolio, or recognizing only a small fraction of its substantial value, would "effectively permit[] [Roger] to avoid his obligation to support his children according to his 'ability,' his 'circumstances and station in life,' and his 'standard of living.'" (See Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 292, quoting § 4053, subds. (a), (d) & (f); see also Destein, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p.1395 [noting that a parent may not place a source of possible income "off-limits" through his or her choice of investment].) We next consider the court's use of 3 percent as a reasonable rate of return. As Roger rightly contends, "figures for earning capacity cannot be drawn from thin air; they must have some tangible evidentiary foundation." (In re Marriage of Cohn (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 923, 931.) In this case, however, we find ample support for the imputed rate of return. At the December hearing, the court explained that 3 percent represents the minimum anticipated return on investment for bonds or certificates of deposit. Roger did not contest the assumption that 3 percent was a reasonable rate of return for these types of investments, just that they were not his preferred forms of investment; in fact, Roger acknowledged that certificates of deposit and some bonds would pay 3 percent. fn. 5 We therefore find that the application of a 3 percent rate of return--an estimate that is {Slip Opn. Page 9} supported by common knowledge and common sense--is supported by substantial evidence. Finally, we reject Roger's argument that the court erred in failing to comply with section 4056. Section 4056 requires the court, among other things, to state in writing or on the record the reasons it deviated from the guideline amount and why the deviation is in the best interests of the children. (§ 4056, subd. (a).) The court's decision to substitute earning capacity for actual income is not, however, a deviation that requires compliance with section 4056. (LeBass, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1336-1337.) The imputation of income relates to an input in the guideline calculation, and is not a deviation from the final guideline amount. (See id. at p. 1337.) We therefore find no error in the court's failure to note "special circumstances" justifying the imputation of a 3 percent rate of return. In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's imputation of income relating to Roger's $2.9 million stock market portfolio. B. Mortgage-Free Housing Roger next objects that the court erroneously "deviated" from the guideline in including $3,000 in the income calculation to account for his mortgage-free home. The impact of free housing on child support payments has been discussed in several different cases. In two cases--Stewart v. Gomez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1748 (Stewart) and County of Kern v. Castle (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1442 (Kern)--the court characterized the fair value of the obligor parent's free housing as income. In Stewart, the father lived rent-free on an Indian reservation. (Stewart, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1754-1755.) The trial court included "the reasonable value of the free rent he received" as part of the father's section 4058 income in calculating child support. (Id. at p. 1752.) The appellate court affirmed, citing subdivision (a)(3) of section 4058, which gives the court discretion to consider as income "employee benefits or self-employment benefits, taking into consideration the benefit to the employee, any corresponding {Slip Opn. Page 10} reduction in living expenses, and other relevant facts." (Id. at p. 1755-1756.) The court concluded that there was "no reason to distinguish an employee housing benefit from an Indian reservation housing benefit." (Id. at p. 1755.) Thus, the trial court "properly included the reasonable rental value of [the father's] house as income." (Ibid.) The appellate court in Kern, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pages 1456-1458, found that the lower court erred in excluding from income any consideration of the benefits the father received as a result of his $1 million inheritance. Citing Stewart, the court observed that, among other things, "the trial court here could have discretionarily considered as income the mortgage-free housing [the father] was living in because he paid the mortgage off with part of the proceeds from his inheritance." (Id. at p. 1451.) The Fourth District, in In re Marriage of Loh (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 325, 333-336, discussed at length the propriety of incorporating non-taxable benefits into child support calculations and ultimately disagreed with the approach set forth in Stewart and recognized in Kern. Reiterating that income tax returns are presumptively correct in calculating a parent's income, the Loh court observed that Stewart and Kern "departed altogether from an income tax model of section 4058 income with regard to certain free housing benefits." (Loh, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 332-333.) The Loh court first questioned the limits of a rule that allows courts to consider anything that reduces living expenses as income, pointing out that it leads to support payments based on money the parent does not have. (Loh, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 334.) Moreover, the Stewart rule, which recognizes as income free housing provided by third parties, is incongruous when compared to the prohibition on considering free housing provided by a new partner or spouse in ordering child support. (Id. at pp. 334-335.) Second, the court noted that 4058, subdivision (a)(3) refers to employee benefits that reduce living expenses, and found no statutory justification for interpreting the plain language of the statute to include as income reductions in living expenses not related to employment. (Id. at p. 335.) The Loh court therefore concluded that if a trial court {Slip Opn. Page 11} determines that a parent's housing situation (or other lifestyle factors) renders application of the guideline amount inappropriate or unjust, such a fact may be considered in a deviation from the guideline, but may not be included as non-taxable income. (Id. at pp. 335-336.) "[T]he proper course [i]s to first calculate the guideline amount in light of the parents' incomes as revealed by such evidence as tax returns, income and expense declarations and pay stubs, and then, under section 4057, to adjust the amount upward in light of the free housing benefit. Such an approach respects the rebuttable correctness of the mechanically calculated guideline amount, and allows child support awards to properly reflect the parents' standard of living without doing violence to the word 'income' in a way that would make the Sheriff of Nottingham proud." (Ibid., footnote omitted.) We believe that the approach outlined in Loh is better suited to the facts of this case. Under the plain language of section 4058, the court's ability to consider house benefits as income is limited to cases involving employment-related housing benefits. An upward adjustment pursuant to section 4057, as Loh suggests, ensures that the court specifies the basis for its deviation from the guideline amount, but still allows the court to recognize the impact a parent's free housing may have on the parent's living expenses and resources. (See § 4057, subd. (b) [requiring the court to state its reasons for departing from the guideline on the record or in writing pursuant to section 4056].) Under section 4057, subdivision (b)(5), the presumption that the guideline amount of child support is correct is rebuttable based on evidence showing that application of the guideline formula "would be unjust or inappropriate due to the special circumstances in the particular case." "Special circumstances" may include the fact that one parent, in a case with substantially equal custody, uses a much higher or lower percentage of income on housing. (§ 4057, subd. (b)(5)(B).) Turning to this case, we note that it involves both the approach outlined approvingly in Loh and the approach used in Stewart. Judge Kelly used the Loh {Slip Opn. Page 12} -sanctioned approach and elected not to include the $3,000 rental value of Roger's house as non-taxable income. fn. 6 The court instead departed from the guideline amount, after the guideline amount was calculated, by approximately $1,000 to reflect the fact that Roger had fewer housing expenses than otherwise would be expected. The court referred specifically to the "special circumstance" of Roger having reduced living expenses and cited Loh as support for the deviation. We find no error in this consideration of Roger's mortgage-free housing situation in determining the appropriate amount of child support. Similarly, we find no error in Commissioner Joseph's subsequent order modifying the temporary child support order, effective November 16, 2004, to account for Roger's mortgage-free housing. Commissioner Joseph deferred to Judge Kelly's calculation of Roger's increased ability to pay support based on his housing situation, and, like Judge Kelly, deviated upward from the guideline amount by $1,062. Contrary to Roger's argument, this modification did not impose a payment that Judge Kelly had rejected, but instead implemented the deviation that Judge Kelly intended to reconsider once updated financial information was available. fn. 7 In calculating the child support payments effective January 1 and January 23, 2006, in contrast, Commissioner Joseph adopted the approach used in Stewart. In the order, the court acknowledged that it "calculated the housing benefit to father different than Judge Kelly" and explained that it included $3,000 of non-taxable income as "a part of the dissomaster calculation." The $3,000 of imputed income, based only on the {Slip Opn. Page 13} purported rental value of the house, bears little or no relation to Roger's actual monthly income. Roger's mortgage-free housing is not an employee benefit, nor is there evidence that it resulted from an effort to funnel income into a form that would not be recognized in the dissomaster calculation. We therefore conclude the court abused its discretion in including the purported rental value of Roger's residence as non-taxable income. We reverse the December 20 child support order and remand to the court to determine the proper guideline amount. On remand, the court may again consider whether Roger's mortgage-free housing is a special circumstance under section 4057 justifying deviation from the guideline amount. C. Discretionary Add-On for Activities In the December 20, 2005 order, the court included a discretionary add-on of $500, to be split evenly by the parties. Roger objects to the add-on, arguing that child support payments must be based solely on income, and that the court has no authority to impose payments for optional activities that one parent considers important. Section 4062 "makes discretionary ('the court may order') additional child support for educational or special needs of a child or for travel expenses for visitation. Among the family law bench and bar, these are usually referred to as . . . discretionary add-ons." (In re Marriage of Fini (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1039 (Fini), emphasis added.) "The amounts in Section 4062, if ordered to be paid, shall be considered additional support for the children and shall be computed in accordance with the following: [¶] (a) If there needs to be an apportionment of expenses pursuant to Section 4062, the expenses shall be divided one-half to each parent, unless either parent requests a different apportionment pursuant to subdivision (b) and presents documentation which demonstrates that a different apportionment would be more appropriate." (§ 4061.) In the December 2005 status report, in preparation for the December hearing on modification of child support, Julie included a detailed list of the girls' activities over several months and the attendant expenses. Julie testified during the December hearing {Slip Opn. Page 14} regarding the children's diminished standard of living since the divorce, including attendance at public school instead of private school. She also testified regarding the approximate cost of the girls' various recreational and educational activities and specified the activities she could no longer afford. After hearing Roger's arguments on the subject, the court included a discretionary add-on of $500 in the child support order: "And that takes care of diminished ability to provide for things as varied as private school, tap dance, gymnastics, dance, dance teams, and other stay-at-home mom activities. [¶] I valued that roughly at $500 a month as being the obligation in order to maintain a standard that was previously enjoyed, half of which will be father's obligation." We find no abuse of discretion. Section 4062 provides for discretionary add-ons to account for the specific needs of the children, including their educational needs. Moreover, the guidelines stress that the parents are mutually responsible for the support of the children, and that the children should be supported according to each parent's ability to pay and standard of living. (See § 4053, subds. (b), (d) & (f).) The court's approach is consistent with the caselaw, and is a valid exercise of the broad authority entrusted to the court to mitigate a decline in the children's standard of living post-dissolution. (See, e.g., de Guigne, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1364-1365 [increases over guideline amount justified to "mitigate an overall decline in the children's standard of living"; $15,000 child support award "rationally related to the children's predissolution standard of living and expenses, and to [father's] ability to pay"]; see also Fini, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044 ["[T]he court in child support proceedings, to the extent permitted by the child support statutes, must be permitted to exercise the broadest possible discretion in order to achieve equity and fairness in these most sensitive and emotional cases."].) D. Improper Modification Roger further argues that it was error for the court to modify the temporary child support orders without using "actual" income figures. This argument is without merit. {Slip Opn. Page 15} First, after reviewing the prior orders and the parties' evidence regarding income, Commissioner Joseph concluded that no change was necessary to the temporary orders based on the updated financial information provided. The court's only modification to the past support payments was based on the mortgage-free housing issue, discussed above: "The court has reviewed all previous support orders and concludes as follows: Effective July 1, 2004, Spousal Support was set for $1241 and Child Support at $2759 . . . This computation seems correct. [¶] Effective November 16, 2004, there was a timeshare change. Spousal Support was set at $1885 and Child Support at $2575. However, Judge Kelly failed to perpetuate his calculated deviation for father's housing circumstance. Therefore Child Support until December 31, 2005 should have been set at $3637." Second, Roger points to no specific differences between the income figures used to calculate the temporary awards and the "actual" or "better" income figures he contends were overlooked. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the court's modification, or lack thereof, of the temporary support orders. E. Attorney's Fees fn. * In 2004, the court ordered, and Roger subsequently paid, $6,500 in attorney's fees. During the May 13, 2005 hearing, Julie's attorney requested an additional $40,000 in attorney's fees and the court ordered Roger to pay $20,000. Roger does not contest the basis for the order, but contends that the court ordered $20,000 total in attorney's fees, which includes the $6,500 that Roger paid prior to the May 13 hearing. Thus, Roger contends, his subsequent payment of $13,500 is sufficient to satisfy his obligation. Julie disagrees, and claims that Roger still owes $6,500. On July 18, 2005, the court filed its Findings and Order After Hearing for the May 13 hearing and ordered $20,000 in attorney's fees. The order contains a handwritten notation stating that "Respondent is credited with $6500 in attorney's fees." Julie's attorney notified the court that she believed this addendum was in error and provided portions of the transcript from the May 13 hearing. At the hearing, the court found that {Slip Opn. Page 16} an "additional $20,000" was appropriate. Judge Kelly, apparently in agreement that the handwritten notation was in error, issued two subsequent written orders, both dated September 16, 2005 and filed September 21, 2005, ordering Roger to pay $20,000 to Julie's attorneys in monthly installments of $5,000 each. No mention was made of a $6,500 credit. These orders did not end the dispute, however. At the urging of the parties, Commissioner Joseph addressed the contested attorney's fees issue at the December 2005 hearing and in a subsequent written order. The December 16, 2005 order states: "This Order After Hearing disposes of one of the remaining two issues; specifically, whether $6,500 in attorney fees is in addition to, or included in, the $20,000 attorney fee Order by Judge Kelly. [¶] The court looks to the Minute Order of May 13, 2005 after having queried Judge Kelly. It is clear that the $20,000 is in addition to the previous order of $6,500. The total fees ordered paid by Respondent to Petitioner's attorney is $26,500." We first address Julie's contention that the attorney's fees order is not a proper subject of this appeal. Roger's notice of appeal refers to the court's December 20, 2005 order "et seq" and not the December 16 order that addressed attorney's fees. However, the court's February 16, 2006 minute order denying Roger's motion for reconsideration (which was issued before Roger filed his notice of appeal) again addressed the fees issue, confirming the court's ruling. Assuming, arguendo, that the issue is properly before the court, we conclude it is without merit. Although the court at one point credited the $6,500 payment against the $20,000 order, it appears to have been a mistake. Judge Kelly amended his original ruling, consistent with the discussion at the May 13 hearing. Roger contends, however, that because Julie's counsel submitted a letter to the court to correct the error, he was not given a proper opportunity to respond. There is no merit to this argument. Not only was Roger present at the May 13 hearing and, at that time, opposed the order and raised the issue of a $6,500 credit, but Commissioner Joseph took the extra step of confirming the {Slip Opn. Page 17} correct interpretation of the order in the record and with Judge Kelly. Roger was given ample opportunity to oppose the attorney's fees order. The order to pay an additional $6,500 in attorney's fees is valid, is not contrary to the court's prior orders, is not an abuse of discretion, and is affirmed. (See Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 283 [awards of attorney's fees in marital dissolution cases are reviewed for an abuse of discretion].) III. Disposition The December 20, 2005 child support order is reversed with directions to recalculate the base child support payments, effective January 1 and January 23, 2006, omitting $3,000 in non-taxable income attributed to Roger's mortgage-free housing. On remand, the court may consider whether Roger's mortgage-free housing is a special circumstance under section 4057 justifying deviation from the guideline amount. The attorney's fees order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. McAdams, J., and Duffy, J., concurred. ­FN *. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of section II.E. ­FN 1. Because the parties share a common surname we use their given names to avoid confusion. ­FN 2. All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise noted. ­FN 3. Roger cites no support for his claim that the stock portfolio pays dividends of about 1.6 percent, other than to claim that a 1.6 percent rate of return is approximately the stock market average. His motion for reconsideration in the trial court further explains that his portfolio's diversity "roughly approximates the USA market average" and that the Standard & Poor's 500 "currently earn about 1.6% in dividends[,]" which also is comparable to his portfolio's returns. ­FN 4. Roger's 2004 tax return shows that he earned ordinary dividends of $38,855 for the year. According to the figures adopted by the trial court, Roger's stock market portfolio contained $2,932,841.10 in June 2004. $38,855 is approximately 1.3 percent of $2,932,841.10. ­FN 5. "The Court: Because bonds pay almost four percent now, bonds are absolutely safe. Mr. Schlafly: Some bonds do. But it's not invested in bonds. Are you saying I should sell my stock and buy bonds instead? The Court: I'm saying you've taken the choice of a risky investment. That doesn't eliminate the ability for you to chose [sic] a stable investment. . . . The Court: You can go to any of the banks here in town and say I have three million dollars cash I'd like for you to take care of for me. They would have you in CD's, guaranteed, insured CD's that would pay you a great deal more than three percent. Mr. Schlafly: That's right, but the assets would decline because -- real assets would decline because of inflation if I do that." ­FN 6. The court explained: "What I'm going to do is adopt the version without the nontaxable income [of $3,000 per month], . . . and I'm going to depart from guideline to have a total support figure of $4,000. Departing from guideline is based on father not having any house expense. And again the Loh case is the authority I'm relying on." ­FN 7. Roger also argues that Julie lives rent-free due to a boyfriend, and questions why that is not incorporated in the guideline calculation. Section 4057.5 prohibits such a consideration. Roger further challenges the basis for the finding that the fair rental value is $3,000. Because we reverse the order imputing $3,000 in fair rental value, we do not reach this argument. ­FN *. See footnote, ante, page 1.
 
 Anna Nicole Smith's Baby's Father Identified
Photographer Larry Birkhead is the father of Anna Nicole Smith's baby, a Bahamas court ruled today after seeing DNA evidence. He said: "My baby's gonna be coming home pretty soon." Howard K. Stern, who is named as the father on Dannielynn's birth certificate, said he would not fight the ruling. At NRG, we deal with paternity issues regularly. If you would like to discuss your specific matter in detail with one of our attorneys, please feel free to contact us at www.nrglaw.net.
 
 Voicemail is Discoverable
Messages left on voicemail can be introduced as evidence. Under Rule 34 (a) of the newly adopted amendments to the FRCP Rules, electronically stored information is now described as; "electronically stored information - including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images and other data or data compilations stored in any medium from which information can be obtained - translated, if necessary, by the respondent into reasonably useable form, or to inspect, copy, test or sample any designated tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b). Voicemail as compared to e-mail in electronic discovery has rarely been an item of interest in the majority of production disputes. In discussions with large numbers of attorneys throughout the past few years, when we bring up voice mail messages as discoverable ESI, the majority of litigators are stumped as to why voice mail is not brought up in civil litigation. Government investigators and trial lawyers alike are being trained on the retrieval of electronic data, including digitized voicemail. Odds are they will be able to get it. Digitized voicemail is a discoverable medium because the rules that govern discovery allow parties to request "data compilations." Under these rules, courts have ordered the production of relevant voicemail messages and files and have even required the producing party to identify all back-up files or archival tapes that would provide information about deleted data. Plan to Act Now Now, rather than when faced with a government subpoena or civil discovery request, is the time to plan your response to requests for voicemail records. Responding to these requests will be no small task. Unlike e-mail, voicemail programs typically do not have a built-in search capability. Messages cannot be scanned by the human eye for key words and phrases; each voice message must be listened to in its entirety in real time in order to determine if it contains relevant information. Planning ahead on how to respond to requests will benefit you in several ways. * If you become involved in litigation, you will need to search your own voicemail database for messages to support your case because federal rules require mandatory disclosures of materials that a party intends to use to support its claims and defenses. * A key admission from the other side may come in the form of a voicemail. If you do not locate and disclose the voicemail at the outset, you may be barred from using it to prove your case. You may have an affirmative duty to maintain your voicemail records. Because digitized voicemail is discoverable, failing to maintain this data may constitute "spoliation" of evidence, meaning that if you fail to preserve key voicemail messages that your adversary claims are relevant, you may be barred from contradicting the evidence that your adversary claims was contained in the voicemail. Digitized voicemail messages may constitute "records" under federal and state statutory schemes, including the new Sarbanes-Oxley bill, that require companies to maintain records of certain activities for specific periods of time.
 
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The paternity by estoppel doctrine does not contain an exception for men who accept the role of fatherhood based on misrepresentations by the subject child's mother, the New York Court of Appeals says. Explaining that the mother's truthfulness is irrelevant and that the child's best interests control, it affirms filiation and support orders entered against a New York man who had been led to believe he fathered a child in Guyana after dating a woman there in 1995.  See Shondel J. v. Mark D., N.Y., No. 46, 7/6/06. For issues regarding paternity, and other child-related legal issues, contact NRG - Nirenstein Ruotolo Group, P.L.C.  
 
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This New York case, brought to our attention by Jeanne M. Hanna, Esq., author of "Updates in Michigan Family Law" is a prime example of the lengths people are willing to go to keep the marital residence from the other spouse.  See the Article. For Arizona Divorce Issues, contact Nirenstein Ruotolo Group.
 
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Grandparent rights case not dismissed from superior court where jurisdiction was based on child being born out-of-wedlock, when subsequently parents remarry.  See Fry v. Garcia, CA-CV 05-0663. For Arizona Grandparent Rights matters contact Nirenstein Ruotolo Group.  
 
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 Colorado Allows 12-Year-Old Girls To Enter Into Common-Law Marriages
Trial court erred in holding that a 15-year-old girl's marriage to an adult man was void ad initio because they did not obtain judicial consent, the Colorado Court of Appeals held June 15. Pointing out that Colorado recognizes common-law marriage, the court noted that there is no statutory provision indicating that the state does not follow the common-law age of consent for marriage, which is age 12 for girls. Thus, it said that so long as all other elements of a common-law marriage are present, the couple's marriage is valid. In re J.M.H., Colo. Ct. App., No. 04CA0740, 6/15/06. For information regarding Common Law Marriages in Arizona, contact NRG Family Law, Arizona's Premier Family Law Firm.The man (who is now 38) and the girl began living together in 2002. They applied for a marriage license in 2003, when she was 15. The girl's mother offered her signed and notarized consent to the marriage, and accompanied them to the county clerk's office to obtain a marriage license. The clerk approved the application and returned it by mail, stating that they were fully registered as a legal married couple. In 2004, the county department of human services petitioned to declare the marriage invalid. The trial court granted the petition, holding that a person under the age of 16 must obtain judicial approval for a valid common-law or ceremonial marriage. It ruled that the marriage was void ab initio under the state's Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, which requires a court to find that an underage party is capable of assuming the responsibilities of marriage and that entering into a marriage would serve that party's best interests. UMA Reversing, Judge Daniel M. Taubman looked to the state's Uniform Marriage Act, which sets forth the rules and requirements for ceremonial marriages in Colorado. He noted that the UMA provides that the statutory age of consent for marriage is 18 and that persons between the ages of 16 and 18 may marry if they obtain parental consent, or if that is not possible, judicial approval. Taubman pointed out, however, that the UMA also provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be deemed to repeal or render invalid any otherwise valid common-law marriage between one man and one woman." Colo. Rev. Stat. ?? 14-2-104(3) (2005). Explaining that Colorado is one of several states that still recognizes common-law marriage, he said that such marriages are governed by common law, not the UMA. Common Law Prevails Finding that Colorado appellate courts had not previously determined the age of consent for a valid common-law marriage, Taubman looked to the origins of common law in Colorado and to other jurisdictions for guidance. He observed that Colorado statutory law provides that the "common law of England ... shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority." ?? 2-4-211. Thus, absent clear legislative intent, the common law prevails in any conflict with statutory law, Taubman said. Also noting that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877), held that common-law marriages are valid--notwithstanding statutes that require ceremonial marriages to be solemnized by a minister or a magistrate--if no specific provision to the contrary exists, Taubman found that other jurisdictions have followed this approach. He added that statutes prescribing the procurement of a license and other formalities to be observed in the solemnization of a marriage do not render invalid a marriage entered into according to the common law--but not in conformity with the statutory formalities--unless the statutes themselves expressly declare such a marriage invalid. Age of Consent Taubman determined that courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly declared that the common-law age of consent applies to common-law marriages, even when statutes otherwise require parental or judicial approval for persons under a specified age, unless such statutes expressly modify or abrogate the common law. Taking note of the ruling in State v. Wade, 766 P.2d 811 (Kan. 1989), that the common-law marriage of a person is valid, regardless of whether the person has reached the age of competency as established by statute, if the person is competent, he observed that under English common law, children above the age of seven could marry, but that such marriage was voidable until the parties reached an age at which they became able to consummate it, which the law presumed to be 14 for males and 12 for females. Going on to note that several jurisdictions have adopted those ages as the common-law ages of consent for marriage, Taubman ruled that the court below erroneously held that persons under the age of 16 may not enter into a valid common-law marriage without judicial approval. He pointed out that neither the UDMA nor the UMA makes any reference, either express or implied, to (1) common-law marriages in general; (2) abrogation or modification of the common law regarding the age of consent for common-law marriage; or (3) the need for any formalities, such as parental consent, to solemnize a common-law marriage between an adult and a minor. Taubman further noted that the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, upon which the UDMA is substantially based, also does not address such issues. Valid Ab Initio "Thus, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, it appears that Colorado has adopted the common-law age of consent for marriage as fourteen for a male and twelve for a female, which existed under English common law. Nevertheless, we need only hold here that a fifteen-year-old girl may enter into a valid common-law marriage," Taubman decided. Taubman went on to say that if all other elements for a common marriage were satisfied in this case, the girl's marriage to the man was valid ab initio because she was competent at common law on the date she was married. Holding therefore that the trial court erred when it required the man to obtain judicial approval for his common-law marriage to the girl, he remanded for an evidentiary hearing addressing whether the elements necessary for establishing a common-law marriage, other than the age of consent, were met.
 
 Colorado Allows 12-Year-Old Girls To Enter Into Common-Law Marriages
Trial court erred in holding that a 15-year-old girl's marriage to an adult man was void ad initio because they did not obtain judicial consent, the Colorado Court of Appeals held June 15. Pointing out that Colorado recognizes common-law marriage, the court noted that there is no statutory provision indicating that the state does not follow the common-law age of consent for marriage, which is age 12 for girls. Thus, it said that so long as all other elements of a common-law marriage are present, the couple's marriage is valid. In re J.M.H., Colo. Ct. App., No. 04CA0740, 6/15/06) For information regarding Common Law Marriages in Arizona, contact NRG Family Law, Arizona's Premier Family Law Firm.The man (who is now 38) and the girl began living together in 2002. They applied for a marriage license in 2003, when she was 15. The girl's mother offered her signed and notarized consent to the marriage, and accompanied them to the county clerk's office to obtain a marriage license. The clerk approved the application and returned it by mail, stating that they were fully registered as a legal married couple. In 2004, the county department of human services petitioned to declare the marriage invalid. The trial court granted the petition, holding that a person under the age of 16 must obtain judicial approval for a valid common-law or ceremonial marriage. It ruled that the marriage was void ab initio under the state's Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, which requires a court to find that an underage party is capable of assuming the responsibilities of marriage and that entering into a marriage would serve that party's best interests. UMA Reversing, Judge Daniel M. Taubman looked to the state's Uniform Marriage Act, which sets forth the rules and requirements for ceremonial marriages in Colorado. He noted that the UMA provides that the statutory age of consent for marriage is 18 and that persons between the ages of 16 and 18 may marry if they obtain parental consent, or if that is not possible, judicial approval. Taubman pointed out, however, that the UMA also provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be deemed to repeal or render invalid any otherwise valid common-law marriage between one man and one woman." Colo. Rev. Stat. ?? 14-2-104(3) (2005). Explaining that Colorado is one of several states that still recognizes common-law marriage, he said that such marriages are governed by common law, not the UMA. Common Law Prevails Finding that Colorado appellate courts had not previously determined the age of consent for a valid common-law marriage, Taubman looked to the origins of common law in Colorado and to other jurisdictions for guidance. He observed that Colorado statutory law provides that the "common law of England ... shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority." ?? 2-4-211. Thus, absent clear legislative intent, the common law prevails in any conflict with statutory law, Taubman said. Also noting that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877), held that common-law marriages are valid--notwithstanding statutes that require ceremonial marriages to be solemnized by a minister or a magistrate--if no specific provision to the contrary exists, Taubman found that other jurisdictions have followed this approach. He added that statutes prescribing the procurement of a license and other formalities to be observed in the solemnization of a marriage do not render invalid a marriage entered into according to the common law--but not in conformity with the statutory formalities--unless the statutes themselves expressly declare such a marriage invalid. Age of Consent Taubman determined that courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly declared that the common-law age of consent applies to common-law marriages, even when statutes otherwise require parental or judicial approval for persons under a specified age, unless such statutes expressly modify or abrogate the common law. Taking note of the ruling in State v. Wade, 766 P.2d 811 (Kan. 1989), that the common-law marriage of a person is valid, regardless of whether the person has reached the age of competency as established by statute, if the person is competent, he observed that under English common law, children above the age of seven could marry, but that such marriage was voidable until the parties reached an age at which they became able to consummate it, which the law presumed to be 14 for males and 12 for females. Going on to note that several jurisdictions have adopted those ages as the common-law ages of consent for marriage, Taubman ruled that the court below erroneously held that persons under the age of 16 may not enter into a valid common-law marriage without judicial approval. He pointed out that neither the UDMA nor the UMA makes any reference, either express or implied, to (1) common-law marriages in general; (2) abrogation or modification of the common law regarding the age of consent for common-law marriage; or (3) the need for any formalities, such as parental consent, to solemnize a common-law marriage between an adult and a minor. Taubman further noted that the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, upon which the UDMA is substantially based, also does not address such issues. Valid Ab Initio "Thus, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, it appears that Colorado has adopted the common-law age of consent for marriage as fourteen for a male and twelve for a female, which existed under English common law. Nevertheless, we need only hold here that a fifteen-year-old girl may enter into a valid common-law marriage," Taubman decided. Taubman went on to say that if all other elements for a common marriage were satisfied in this case, the girl's marriage to the man was valid ab initio because she was competent at common law on the date she was married. Holding therefore that the trial court erred when it required the man to obtain judicial approval for his common-law marriage to the girl, he remanded for an evidentiary hearing addressing whether the elements necessary for establishing a common-law marriage, other than the age of consent, were met.
 

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SCO or System V or SCO OpenServer Custom Server Tech Support
Many large organizations have legacy servers which have been in service for over 10 years, and no one is left with the expertise to fix problems when they occur. Near the end of their service lives, these servers will require support sooner or later.
Linux and Open Source Strategy and Support
Linux provides strategic advantages and unlocks valuable new opportunities to integrate information inflows and outflows.
Remote System Administration
A master system administrator can manage hundreds of computers with ease, which means that companies with 20-30 computers and a full-time system administrator are not fully utilizing this individual's core strengths.
Finding MySQL Databases in Lost+Found
MySQL MYD and MYI and FRM files store the table name in the file name. What if the file names are lost due to hard drive partition table corruption? Transparen can help.
IT Support, System Administration and Data Recovery Prices
Transparen's service goes all the way to the most difficult tasks that other companies cannot complete.
Data Recovery Price Phone Call Scripts
If the drive is malfunctioning - send it directly to people who have invested in knowing what to do (i.e. Transparen). Do not gradually upgrade from the lowest quality service to the highest quality service - this diminishes the chance of success.
Octel and SCO X.25 Integration Troubleshooting in Toronto Ontario
Transparen's UNIX team can assist with a variety of networking and telephony issues having to do with Octel integration, X.25 networking, SCO UNIX troubles, and Ingres db recovery.
Building a Service-Oriented Technology Consulting Company
Imagine calling a tech support line and reaching a human being - not a scripted one - who could solve your tech support issue on the spot.
Transparen's Experience in Web Hosting
Web hosting applications often require extreme uptime. Server hardware comprises one part of how to obtain this level of uptime.
System Administration Computer Support
Transparen works closely with qualified clients to develop robust system administration procedures to minimize downtime, emergency response times, and costs...
Computer Support and Repair Shop Partnership Program
Computer support and repair shops can obtain better profitability by concentrating on what they do best. Perhaps it is selling, and perhaps it is service. Perhaps it is both.
Added Value Tech Support Plans for Entrepreneurs and Computer Support Consultancies
You can't be there all the time - but if you partner with Transparen, then you'll have a useful team of cooperative and highly skilled technical support people behind you, so if you take an hour off, your clients will still be supported.
Overnight and 2-day Computer Repair
April 2006 - Transparen Corporation, based in Surrey BC, launched GVRD-wide computer repair service with FREE pickup and drop-off of computers, overnight service, and two-day service. Ideal for business or individuals.
The Importance of Backups - Why Not To Rely On Data Recovery
Keep regular backups. Keep regular backups. Keep regular backups. Keep regular backups. Keep regular backups. Keep regular backups. Keep regular backups.
   
 
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